Martin Bormann's 'Flight Capital Program'
"Bury your treasure, for you will need it to begin a Fourth Reich." [cdxxiii
Adolf Hitler
To Martin Bormann in 1943
"When the story of Martin Bormann is written it will reveal him to be the man largely responsible for West Germany's postwar recovery...." [cdxxiv
The New York Times
March 3, 1973
The Strasbourg Conference where Bormann introduced a new economic initiative, was convened under the highest secrecy and security in August 1944, to discuss post-war preparations between the Nazi government and the major German industrialists, as was so often the pattern with other issues since the end of World War One. [cdxxxv Bormann assigned Dr. Bosse, of the Ministry of Armaments, and Lieutenant General Sheid to conduct the conference in his behalf. [cdxxxvi
"German industry must realize that the war cannot now be won," Bormann told Sheid, continuing, "and (Germany) must take steps to prepare for a postwar commercial campaign which will in time insure the economic resurgence of Germany." [cdxxxvii
What Bormann was proposing was devious, conspiratorial and illegal, even within Nazi Germany. To avoid security breaches, therefore, he ensured in every possible way that the strictest secrecy was maintained. The meeting was held in a hotel conference room insulated from visual or audio surveillance by having rented all the rooms above, below and on all sides of the chamber. All attendees and their personal possessions were thoroughly inspected physically and electronically by SS technicians. [cdxxxviii
High-ranking industrialists from a spectrum of German firms listened intently to the amazing proposal: All corporations that agreed with Bormann's plan to conserve their businesses for post-war operations and to share post-war revenues with selected underground Nazi operations would, until such time as the Third Reich failed, be protected by Bormann from the "Treason Against The Nation" law. [cdxxxix This law required death for all those who subverted currency regulations, traded in foreign currency or concealed ownership of foreign currency. The law also precluded firms from being involved in almost any type of partnership, joint venture or licensing agreement with any country outside of the Reich or the boundaries of its allies.
In reality, many of Germany's largest companies were already engaged in relationships with businesses neutral to or hostile to the Reich, including Germany's largest conglomerate, I.G. Farben, but the government had been turning a blind eye in order to keep the huge amount of capital these companies generated rolling in. The waiver of the Treason Against the Nation law proposed at Strasbourg was therefore not only an incentive to those German companies that desired to survive the war but were not yet participating in such activities, but it was a veiled threat to those that were already circumventing the law. To them Bormann was saying, in essence, if you do not share the wealth you are already gaining, we will have your heads by enforcing the law. The Strasbourg announcement, for these companies, amounted to a form of blackmail; which they were glad to pay not only to save themselves but to save their companies from the post-war commercial blood bath that was sure to come.
According to Dr. Bosse, participating companies' and Nazi funds were to be invested in foreign financial institutions while the Party maintained access to them, "in order that a strong German empire can be created after defeat." [cdxl Bosse went on to explain: "Industrialists with government assistance [meaning with Bormann as their mentor and protector - author's note] will export as much of their capital as possible, capital meaning money, bonds, patents, scientists and administrators."[ [cdxli] While hard currency was valuable, the currency with real potential was the "soft capital" the industrialist firms held: the trade agreements, patents and braintrusts that generated colossal revenues in perpetuity.
The potential income of such intellectual and proprietary properties as international licenses sold to use the patents on stainless steel, synthetic fuels and rubbers and other commercial advances, and control of the braintrusts who created them was huge, generating millions, possible tens or hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Many international companies, such as Bayer, Winthrop Chemical, AGFA-ANSCO, Hoescht and DuPont to a large degree owed their existence and continuing prosperity to exclusive use of I.G. Farben patents and licenses alone. [cdxlii
In addition to exporting technologies, the German firms were directed to borrow against these and other assets to obtain more hard capital and thus be able to more quickly export additional hard currency [cdxliii into what was now being called Bormann's "Flight Capital" program. Technical and business bureaus were to be established for each industry and in each foreign office of each company, with a covert Nazi liaison officer in each office to oversee and, where possible, personally manage the operations. [cdxliv From among these liaisons German economic specialists successfully penetrated 11 nations' economies, in addition to Germany's, and eventually controlled them in the post-war period. [cdxlv
Bosse reported to Bormann after the meeting that the terms of the Strasbourg conference had been agreed to by all involved and therefore the new Flight Capital Program had been successfully initiated. [cdxlvi Bormann in turn established 750 camouflaged corporations under the names of companies or individuals for which he held power of attorney, and therefore over which he had total control, [cdxlvii as vehicles for managing the income of the Flight Capital Program. These businesses were scattered across countries throughout Europe, the Mid-east and Latin America. Holdings were even kept in bank accounts in the United States of America, [cdxlviii some of which eventually were in his own name, including accounts with Manufacturers Hanover Trust, The Chase Manhattan Bank, and First National City Bank, according to author Paul Manning.
Although not listed as a company represented at the Strasbourg conference, Germany's largest industrial cartel, the chemical concern I.G. Farben, was active in the Flight Capital Program as well. In fact, it had not been necessary for Farben representatives to attend the program's introduction at all because it's leader, chairman and president Hermann Schmitz, had been integrally involved in the Flight Capital Program's creation. I.G. Farben had supported the Nazi cause from the beginning of the its climb to power, having donated generously through Farben's intelligence, propaganda and political economic operations, known as I.G. NW7. [cdxlix
In his Wall Street Journal article, Steinmetz unwittingly hints at this involvement - and particularly at the Flight Capital Program - in a portion of the article that reviews reports that Germany's Bosch AG company during the war allied with the wealthy Wallenberg family of Sweden to camouflage German funds. Robert Bosch, the founder of Bosch AG, was the uncle of Carl Bosch, [cdl the founder of I.G. Farben. Close relationships were maintained between the companies.
Before taking Carl Bosch's place at the head of I.G. Farben, Schmitz had been Bosch's top lieutenant and handpicked successor. [cdli He had overseen all of I.G. Farben's international business, and, between the wars, was responsible for concealing Farben's huge global income from German tax administrators through the use of foreign "blinds" he had created. These camouflage devices operated remarkably like the alleged arrangement between Bosch A.G. and the Wallenberg's. [cdlii
Before the war, Schmitz took over the helm of I.G. Farben and had become a close "confidant and advisor to Martin Bormann," [cdliii writes Paul Manning in his book Martin Bormann: Nazi In Exile. Manning adds that Bormann was a student in a sort of personal, and confidential, tutelage under Schmitz. [cdliv Bormann, in fact, surreptitiously gave the title of "Secret Councilor to the Nazi Party and Martin Bormann," to Hermann Schmitz, [cdlv in return for the latter's intellectual contributions and mentoring. Under Schmitz's direction and with the complicity of Bormann, I.G. Farben looted the chemical properties of the nations Germany had conquered: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway and France. [cdlvi
By the end of the war, Farben had interests in over 700 companies, not including operations within its own corporate structure that stretched across 93 countries. [cdlvii In all, Schmitz, in league with Bormann, who cleared the path of government constraints, expanded Farben's foreign investment to at least 7 billion reichsmarks during the war. [cdlviii As the two men weaved their web they made many pacts; among them one that ensured all Farben leaders overseas were Nazi Party members accountable to Martin Bormann - a precursor to the Flight Capital Program. Working together, the two men expanded this relationship to other German firms in the form of the Flight Capital Program.
The objective of the Flight Capital Program was not to make money in and of itself. The objective - Bormann's master plan - was to save and protect Germany's industries and economy from being looted at the hands of the conquerors as had happened at the end of the First World War. After the war, the Flight Capital Program would control and direct not only the German economy, but also other economies linked to the underground Fatherland, in an effort to produce a quick German rebirth and eventual European economic domination.
Bormann and Schmitz met on multiple occasions while developing the Flight Capital Program. [cdlix So thoroughly did Bormann capture all of the funds transferred out of the Reich that when Hermann Schmitz died in 1960, at the age of 79, he was nearly a pauper. [cdlx "To this day no one has been able to explain what happened to his fortune. Few who knew him can believe it doesn't exist," wrote Joseph Borkin, author of The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben.
Strategies for covertly redeploying the economy included the implementation of a "foreign trade offensive," according to Peter Hayes' book Industry and Technology: I.G. Farben in the Nazi Era. [cdlxi
They also included a "'European economic community'" that positioned Germany as the hub and "flag bearer" of a confederated Europe that would "predominate by 'elastic political methods'... not with brutal force."
These elements are certainly recognizable in the history of post-war Europe as it actually unfolded, and, in fact, continues with a high profile in the European economic model of today. The evidence reflects that the Flight Capital Program and Bormann's partnership with I.G.Farben not only paid off as planned, but it set the foundation for the European economy of today, and by extension that of the world.
But in April 1945, with Berlin succumbing to the Russian siege, a hysterical Hitler visibly crumbling in front of him, and the Reich reeling in its death throws, Bormann, true to his brutish, realistic, pragmatic nature and leaning heavily on his incomparable bureaucratic proclivities, was focused on escaping.
Bormann was willing, able and self-authorized to negotiate any agreement that secured his - and presumably, at one time, the Fuehrer's - escape. Signals from "The Brown Eminence's" radios bounced to and from various German generals authorized to negotiate with Russian and United States military leaders. The Allies, in complete control and determined to achieve nothing but total and unconditional surrender - outwardly at least - would not negotiate. Escape was the only option.
Notes:
cdxxiii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 29
cdxxiv Paul Manning, New York Times, March 3, 1973, p. 31, column 2
cdxxv Ladislas Farago, Aftermath, pp. 201-203; Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 207, 208; Alan Levy, The Weisenthal File, p. 222
cdxxvi Greg Steinmetz, The Wall Street Journal, 28 April, 1997; Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 207; Ladislas Farago, Aftermath, pp. 201-203; Alan Levy, The Weisenthal File, p. 222
cdxxvii Greg Steinmetz, The Wall Street Journal, 28 April, 1997; Harry Cooper, Sharkhunters KTB 104, p. 8; Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 207; Ladislas Farago, Aftermath, p. 202
cdxxviii Jochen von Lang, The Secretary, pp. 172, 173, 183
cdxxix William Stevenson, The Bormann Brotherhood, pp. 150-152
cdxxx Ladislas Farago, Aftermath, pp. 220. 221
cdxxxi Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 44
cdxxxii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 114
cdxxxiii Greg Steinmetz, The Wall Street Journal, 28 April, 1997
cdxxxiv William Stevenson, The Bormann Brotherhood, p. 66
cdxxxv Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 23; William Stevenson, The Bormann Brotherhood, p. 67
cdxxxvi Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 23
cdxxxvii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 24
cdxxxviii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 24
cdxxxix Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 25
cdxl Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 26
cdxli Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 27
cdxlii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 117
cdxliii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 25
cdxliv Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 26, 27
cdxlv Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 114
cdxlvi Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 27
cdxlvii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 11; William Stevenson, The Bormann Brotherhood, p. 68
cdxlviii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, pp. 139, 205
cdxlix Raymond G. Stokes, Divide and Prosper, p. 24
cdl Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, p. 56
cdli Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, p. 165
cdlii Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, p. 180
cdliii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, caption, second photo section
cdliv Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 114
cdlv Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 114
cdlvi Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, p. 2
cdlvii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 153
cdlviii Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, p. 28
cdlix Paul Manning, Nazi In Exile, pp. 157-162; Peter Hayes, Industry and Technology: I.G. Farben in the Nazi Era, p. 368
cdlx Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, p. 166
cdlxi Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: I.G. Farben in the Nazi Era, p. 368
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